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Abstract: 
Countries vigorously compete for sports mega-events in hopes of generating an 
economic impact during the event but also long-term growth induced by the hallmark 
event. It is well understood that the economic legacy depends on the infrastructure that 
not only facilitates the games but also has far broader implications for sustainable 
economic activity in the host city’s economy. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the 
extent to which developing and developed countries adopt different strategies as it related 
to the composition of infrastructure enhancements that have implications for the 
generation of an economy legacy from the mega-sports event. 
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Introduction and Background 
 
 Sporting mega-events such as the Summer and Winter Olympic Games or soccer’s World 
Cup focus the world’s attention on the region hosting the event and are highly sought-after by 
cities and countries around the globe. It would not be an exaggeration to suggest that the 
competition among cities and countries to host these events can often be as fierce as the 
competition among the athletes on the playing field. Over the past decade or two, developing 
countries have increasing thrown their hats into the ring for a chance to host these mega-events. 
However, the cost of operating, organizing, and building infrastructure for an Olympic Games or 
World Cup can be daunting, especially for developing nations without the same level of sports 
and tourism infrastructure that exists in many industrialized countries. On the other hand, mega-
events present an opportunity to generate the political will necessary to make investments in 
general infrastructure that can lead to long-run economic growth. From an economic standpoint, 
the question is whether mega-events represent a good investment for developing countries and 
whether developing nations have used mega-events differently than industrialized nations to 
promote general infrastructure development. These are the questions that will be addressed in 
this chapter.  
 The modern Summer Olympic Games began in 1896 and take place every four years at 
new locations selected through an elaborate bidding process many years in advance of the event. 
The Winter Olympics, held since 1924, follow an identical procedure. In recent times, the host 
city for both the Summer and Winter Games has been selected six or seven years before the 
event is to take place. Historically, hosting the Olympic Games has been almost exclusively the 
domain of rich, industrialized nations. Between 1896 and 1952, every Summer and Winter 
Games was held in either Western Europe or the U.S. with cities in Japan, Canada, and Australia 
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joining the mix over the next two decades. Mexico City in 1968 was the first location outside the 
industrialized world in which the Games were held. Eastern European countries were awarded 
the Summer Games in 1980 (Moscow) and Winter Games in 1984 (Sarajevo, Yugoslavia). 
Seoul, Korea was awarded the 1988 Summer Games, a time during which South Korea might be 
classified as “rapidly industrializing” rather than industrialized, but it is probably fair to note that 
shortly after the Olympics, the country was admitted to the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD), a de facto dividing line between industrialized and 
developing nations.  
 More recently, however, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) has encouraged 
bids from poorer countries and has awarded the Games on several occasions to countries outside 
of the OECD. The 2008 Summer Games were hosted by China, and the 2016 Summer Olympics 
will be played in Rio de Janeiro, the first time the event has taken place in the South America. In 
both cases, the winning nations prevailed over numerous bidders from various industrialized 
countries. The next two Winter Olympics will be played outside of Western Europe, North 
America, and Japan, for only the second and third times with the 2014 Winter Olympics in 
Sochi, Russia, and the 2018 Winter Games in Pyeongchang, South Korea. The list of countries 
submitting formal bids has also dramatically changed in recent decades. Twenty percent of the 
bids submitted for the Summer Games prior to 2000 came from outside of Western Europe, 
Japan, Australia, Canada, and the U.S. Since 2000, however, over half of all bids have come 
from this group including applications by Istanbul, Bangkok, Havana, Buenos Aires, and Cape 
Town, among others, plus, of course, the successful bids by Beijing and Rio. On the Winter 
Olympics side, the past decade has witnessed bids from Kazakhstan, Georgia, China, Slovakia, 
and Poland for the first time. (See Table 1.)   
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 The world’s other major international mega-sporting event is the Fédération 
Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) World Cup. Like the Olympics, this event takes 
place every four years and features soccer teams composed of players grouped by nationality (i.e. 
“national teams”). The World Cup3 began in 1930 in response to soccer’s growing prominence in 
the Olympics. Due to the number of large stadiums required to accommodate the tournament, 
FIFA selects a host country for the event as opposed to the IOC’s tradition of choosing a single 
host city. For the first 60 years of the competition, the World Cup essentially alternated between 
the two centers of soccer interest, Europe and Latin America, so unlike the Olympics, numerous 
countries in Central and South America have hosted the World Cup including Uruguay, Brazil, 
Chile, Argentina, and Mexico.  
This rotation scheme lasted until 1994 when FIFA, in an attempt to expand world interest 
in the game, awarded the World Cup to the U.S., a huge untapped market for the sport. Japan and 
South Korea followed in 2002, the first tournament co-hosted by two countries and the first 
World Cup played in Asia. More “firsts” followed: South Africa became the first African host in 
2010, Russia becomes the first Eastern European host in 2018, and Qatar, a nation with no 
domestic soccer league and little soccer history or tradition, is slated to become the first Middle 
Eastern host in 2022. In 2014, the World Cup returns to a Latin American country for the first 
time in nearly 30 years in Brazil. 
It is interesting to note that as the world’s attention in the economic realm has 
increasingly shifted from the so-called G-7 nations, which include the world’s largest 
industrialized economies such as the U.S., Japan, U.K., and Germany, to the BRICS nations, an 
                                                          
3 Other international sporting organizations, notably in Cricket and Rugby, also host similar international 
tournaments that are dubbed “the World Cup.” These events are typically smaller than the FIFA World Cup, and for 
the purposes of this paper, the term “World Cup” is meant to describe the soccer tournament unless specifically 
noted otherwise. 
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acronym for the five rapidly developing nations of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South 
Africa, so too has attention shifted in the sports world. Including the 2010 Commonwealth 
Games hosted by India, every BRICS nation will have held at least one of the world’s top 
sporting events between 2008 and 2018. 
While it is clear that developing nations have stepped up their efforts to host these events, 
their motivations are less clear. Certainly, there are political considerations that may induce a 
country’s leadership to bid for an event without any concern for the economic implications. For 
example, the 1995 Rugby World Cup held in South Africa gave the country an opportunity to 
“announce its re-emergence as a full member of not only the world’s sporting community but its 
political community. The picture of South African President Nelson Mandela wearing the jersey 
of the white South African captain Francois Pienaar while presenting him with the championship 
trophy, was a powerful image to the world indicating that South Africa had emerged from its 
years of racial oppression and served to unify the country.” (Matheson and Baade, 2004, pg. 
1094)  From an economic perspective, however, the benefits are much less clear.  
 
Short-run costs and benefits 
 It is undeniable that mega-events result in significant tourism expenditures by sports fans, 
but in many cases the observed increases in economic activity during the event fall well short of 
the economic impact predicted by event organizers. Focusing just on the Olympics and World 
Cup, Table 2 shows commissioned ex ante economic impact studies for various Olympics and 
World Cups.  Table 3 shows ex post estimates of short run economic impact performed by 
economists not associated with the events for various Olympics and World Cups examining 
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actual economic data before, during, and after the events. In the majority of cases, independent 
economists find little or no direct economic impact of mega-events on host economies. 
 The disconnect between ex ante predictions and ex post reality comes as a result of 
numerous factors. Obviously, any economic impact studies may be biased if inflated, unrealistic, 
or best-case projections are used. But even under realistic assumptions, economic impact 
estimates often suffer from at least three deficiencies that serve to exaggerate the numbers. First, 
to the extent a sporting event attracts spectators from the local community, any money spent by 
these fans is money not being spent by these residents elsewhere in the local economy. Spending 
by local citizens does not represent new money in the economy but is rather simply money that is 
reallocated within the city or country. For example, at least 400,000 of the 3 million tickets for 
the 2014 World Cup in Brazil are available for sale exclusively to Brazilians, often at a 
discounted price (BBC, 2013). While this strategy is likely to engender goodwill among local 
residents and provide a festive atmosphere inside the stadiums, it does little to promote economic 
growth or pay for costs of hosting the event.   
Second, sports fans can crowd out regular visitors displacing economic activity that would have 
occurred in the absence of the sporting event. While a city’s hotels and restaurants may be full of 
sports fans during a tournament, if those same hotel rooms and restaurants would have been full 
of business travelers or other vacationers in the absence of the mega-event, then the tournament 
may not result in a net increase in economic activity. For example, although the 2012 Summer 
Olympics attracted 800,000 international visitors to the U.K., the government reported,  
“Despite this influx of Games visitors, overall international visitor numbers to the U.K. 
were actually down in Q3 2012 when compared to the previous year. This suggests that 
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there was substantial displacement of regular visitors who were deterred by the potential 
for overcrowding, disruption and price rises because of the Games.” (UK, 2013, pg. 18)   
Similarly, while initial projections for the 2010 World Cup in South Africa predicted 483,000 
international visitors for the event, econometric analysis of tourist arrivals to the country 
suggests an increase of only 123 to 202 thousand above what would have normally been 
expected without the World Cup (Matheson, Peeters, and Syzmanski, 2012). 
Third, money spent in a local economy during a mega-event may not stick in the local 
economy. Mega-events are frequently characterized by capacity constraints and high prices for 
items such as accommodations. Indeed, the U.K. government claimed that despite a fall in raw 
tourism numbers during the 2012 Olympics, “the average spend of Games visitors was around 
double that of a normal visitor and as a result there was a substantial net increase in overseas 
visitor spend of £235million.” (UK, 2013, pg. 18)  While the combined effect of lower visitor 
numbers combined with higher prices may have led to higher direct spending, it is quite possible 
that indirect spending and the multiplier effect actually fell. As case in point, hotel rooms can 
frequently sell at three or four time their normal rates during mega-events, but the desk clerks 
and room cleaners who service these establishments will not generally see their wages triple or 
quadruple. Thus, the tourist industry should see an increase in returns to capital with little effect 
on returns to labor. In addition, some of the higher spending at the event leaks out of local 
economy as many hotels or other service industries are owned by outside individuals.  
 
Short-run costs 
Hosting mega-events can be an enormously expensive affair and governing bodies such 
as the IOC and FIFA typically require that the majority of the costs be borne by the host country. 
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The Olympics require a large amount of very specific sports infrastructure in order to 
accommodate the range of events, and FIFA requires World Cup hosts to have at least 12 
modern stadiums capable of seating at least 40,000 spectators with one of the stadiums being 
able to seat at least 80,000 for the opener and the final. While both the IOC and FIFA claim to be 
cost conscious, the evidence suggests otherwise. Faced with bids from multiple competing cities 
and countries, the organizing bodies have rarely selected hosts that have promised to minimize 
spending on sports infrastructure. Indeed, the only recent Olympic Games that involved 
essentially no new sports venues was the 1984 Summer Olympics in Los Angeles. However, Los 
Angeles was the only city that submitted a bid that year, allowing it to dictate the terms to the 
IOC rather than the other way around. More commonly, host cities and countries face numerous 
competitors, and bids without lavish spending on both facilities and operations are doomed to 
lose. In its bid for the 2022 World Cup, the U.S. proposed using 18 currently existing stadiums 
with another 38 completed stadiums being considered earlier in the bid process (US Soccer, 
2009). In effect, the U.S. demonstrated that it could meet FIFA’s stadium requirements five 
times over without any new spending on sports facilities. Instead, FIFA chose Qatar as the host, 
a selection that will require the country to build 10 new 45,000-person, fully air conditioned 
stadiums from scratch many of which will then be disassembled after the games and rebuilt in a 
variety of developing countries. While the U.S. bid would have maximized the joint profits of 
FIFA and the host country by minimizing infrastructure costs, the Qatar bid is apparently how 
one maximizes the chance of winning the hosting rights if profit to the host nation is not a 
consideration. In total, Qatar is reportedly prepared to spend $200 billion in its preparations for 
the 2022 tournament (AP, 2013). 
10 
 
Operating costs can often entail heavy expenditures in large part due to the extensive 
security requirements that mega-events require. The security budget alone for the Athens 
Olympics of 2004 ran to over $1.5 billion, nearly 6 times the budget for the Sydney Games just 4 
years earlier. The 2010 FIFA World Cup entailed $3.9 billion in expenses borne by South Africa, 
including at least $1.3 billion in stadium construction costs (Voigt, 2010; Baade and Matheson, 
2012) although some estimates place the total as high as $12 billion. Brazil’s budgets for 2014 
World Cup and 2016 Olympics are $13.3 billion and $18 billion respectively, and as is common 
in sporting events, costs have escalated drastically in just a few short years (Zimbalist, 2011).  
“Back in 2009, the Brazilian Football Confederation estimated the 12 stadiums being 
refitted or built for the World Cup would cost about 2.2 billion reais – a figure that two 
years later seems quaint. The government now sees them costing more than triple that, at 
6.9 billion reais.” (Grudgings, 2011) 
 Table 3 shows the sports infrastructure, non-sports infrastructure, and operational 
spending for various recent mega-events. Full information is not available for all events. Sports 
infrastructure includes spending on stadiums and sports venues while non-sport infrastructure 
includes construction costs for transportation, tourist and athlete accommodations, and public 
spaces. It is important to note that the dividing line between sports infrastructure and non-sports 
infrastructure is not entirely clear. For example, 20% of the total budgeted cost for London’s new 
Wembley Stadium was $150 million in general infrastructure improvements including a new 
roads and a renovated Underground station designed to better accommodate stadium traffic. 
While the roads and subway station are clearly not a part of the stadium, without the stadium, the 
roads and station would not be required (Matheson, 2008). It is also worth noting that the entire 
Wembley project, which played a significant role in the 2012 London Summer Games, ended up 
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costing 798 million pounds, over twice its original budget, yet another example of optimistic 
accounting in sporting events. 
 Given the huge costs associated with mega-events and the relatively small number of 
visitors, it is virtually impossible for the direct revenues associated with these events to cover 
their expenses. This is less true if little in the way of new infrastructure needs to be built. For 
example, total infrastructure costs for the 1994 World Cup held in the U.S. were only $30 
million as the existing stadiums in the country were more than adequate for the event. Similarly, 
the 1984 Summer Games in Los Angeles made a large profit for the organizers, again because 
existing facilities were used for most events. Given the huge increases in security that have 
arisen in the post 9/11 world, however, it is uncertain whether even with no capital outlays that a 
mega-event would have short-run net benefits that exceed the operating costs for the host. Thus, 
economic rationality rests on the legacy effects of the events in terms of branding or economic 
growth based on infrastructure legacies.  
  
Long-run benefits 
 If a temporary surge in visitors or the creation of new or improved sports infrastructure 
cannot be seen as saviors for mega-events, then one is left to appeal to the creation a long-term 
legacy, perhaps through the construction of non-sports infrastructure, as an economic 
justification for hosting mega-events. As can be seen in Table 4, non-sports related infrastructure 
expenditures often exceed the spending on sports venues by a wide margin, and unlike sports 
venues, expenditures on transportation networks and other types of general infrastructure have 
the potential to encourage future growth. Mega-events can serve as an impetus to engage in 
needed infrastructure investments that don’t get done due to a lack of political will. Furthermore, 
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given the high need for infrastructure improvements in the developing world, it is likely that the 
bids organized by poorer countries may distinctly differ from those in industrialized nations by 
emphasizing general infrastructure development. 
Brazil, for example, is engaging in massive investment spending in its run up to the 2014 
World Cup and 2016 Summer Olympics. The words of Brazilian Football Confederation 
President Ricardo Teixeira echo those of many proponents of mega-events.   
"We are a civilized nation, a nation that is going through an excellent phase, and 
we have got everything prepared to receive adequately the honor to organize an 
excellent World Cup. Over the next few years we will have a consistent influx of 
investments. The 2014 World Cup will enable Brazil to have a modern 
infrastructure. In social terms it will be very beneficial.… Our objective is to 
make Brazil become more visible in global arenas. The World Cup goes far 
beyond a mere sporting event. It’s going to be an interesting tool to promote 
social transformation.” (CNN, 2007) 
The 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi, Russia and the Russia’s 2018 World Cup elicit 
similar remarks. In response to the reported $51 billion price tag for the Sochi Games, IOC 
President Jacques Rogge noted, 
 “You have to put it into proportion. The organization of the games is not 
going to cost a lot of money. But the government ... wished to develop the whole 
area. You cannot just take the cost of the train and the tunnels and the road into 
the cost of the games because this tunnel and the train and the road are not meant 
for two weeks of competition, they are meant for generations to last.” 
(Buravchenko, 2013) 
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According to Jean-Claude Killy, chair of the IOC’s coordination commission for the 
Sochi Games, the high cost is partly due to the fact that 85 percent of the infrastructure had to be 
built from scratch (RT.com). The costs for 2018 World Cup follow a similar pattern. The budget 
has ballooned from roughly $10 billion at the time the competition was awarded to Russia in 
2010 to $20.5 billion in the fall of 2012 to $29 billion by spring of 2013. The Ministry of Sport, 
however has warned the government that they will need $44 billion to organize the 
championships at an appropriate level (Kuvshinova, 2013).  This figure includes, perhaps, $7.5 
billion to build or renovate the 12 stadiums required for event, but the overwhelming majority of 
the spending is going towards general infrastructure such as roads, subways, and airports 
(Mackay, 2012).   
The potential for the surge in general infrastructure investment as a result of preparations 
for a mega-event leading to overall economic growth following the event is a real possibility; 
however, several caveats are in order. First, spending millions or billions of dollars in 
unproductive sports infrastructure simply in order to have the excuse or the political will to make 
needed non-sports infrastructure investments is a distinctly second-best economic strategy. 
Public capital would be more efficiently allocated if governments would simply make reasonable 
public investment choices without a mega-event hanging over their heads. 
In addition, mega-events can place surprising tight deadlines on major public works 
projects. These deadlines can serve to raise costs due to rushed schedules, relaxed bidding rules, 
and potential corruption. Indeed, as the event nears it may become all too common for a host 
nation trying to stay within a fixed budget to reallocate resources towards sports infrastructure, 
which absolutely must be completed ahead of the event, and away from the general infrastructure 
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improvements that were both promised and also comprised the best hope for long-run economic 
growth.  
Finally, it should be noted that preparations for a mega-event can result in too high a 
level of investment in non-athletic infrastructure. An airport, transportation network, or number 
of hotel rooms that is the right size for three weeks of tourist insanity may be extensively 
overbuilt for the post-event period. For example, two major luxury hotels built for the 1994 
Winter Olympics in Lillehammer, Norway, filed for bankruptcy shortly after the close of the 
Games.  
 At this point we turn to an examination of long-run economic performance of host 
nations to examine whether the potential for long-run growth as a result of a mega-event can be 
observed empirically. We use data from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to compare 
macroeconomic indicators between hosts and non-hosts. Our sample frame is 1980 to 2013. The 
IMF provides data for 186 countries, though we omit countries with less than $20 billion in 
average gross domestic product during our sample frame since these countries are both highly 
unlikely to host an Olympics or World Cup, and may have volatile economies based on only one 
or two major industries. 
Most of our comparisons are between members and non-members of the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). According to its website, “the mission of the 
OECD is to promote policies that will improve the economic and social well-being of people 
around the world”.4 Its 34 members are well-developed democracies and serve as our proxy for 
an industrialed nation in this context. Roughly half of these countries became members during 
the formation of the OECD in 1961 and the other half have since been added. One notable 
addition is South Korea, which became an OECD member between the 1988 Summer Olympics 
                                                          
4 http://www.oecd.org/about/, accessed 7-15-2013.  
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in Seoul and the 2002 World Cup. Our definition of OECD-membership is year-specific for this 
reason. Although the year varies, typically the last years of this sample frame are IMF 
projections. We minimize the use of projections where possible, but some remain since non-
OECD countries hosting an Olympics or World Cup is a relatively recent phenomenon.  
Table 5 lists the year and host of a Summer Olympics, Winter Olympics, and World 
Cups. During this sample frame, there were 26 of these events, 20 of which were held in 12 
different OECD countries. Despite this trend, the next time each event is held will be in a non-
OECD country.   
 We restict our data analysis to three variables: the growth rate of real gross domestic 
product (GDP), the unemployment rate, and the growth rate of real exports. The first two 
indicators measure the economic well-being of a nation, while the latter could plausibly be 
influenced by the heightened publicity for an area that serves as a host. Each of the these 
indicators is represented as a rate to provide a level playing field for this diverse list of countries. 
The GDP and exports growth rates use constant dollars, though the base year varies.  
 Table 6 presents comparisons of our three macronecomic indicators across host/non-host 
and OECD/non-OECD countries. For now, our definition of hosting is any of the Summer 
Olympics, Winer Olympics, and World Cups between 1980 and 2013. In addition, the means for 
each indicator are taken over the entire sample frame. We omit South Korea for this analysis 
since its OECD membership was different for the two events it hosted. We also include Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, which does not have data until 1999, to augment the relatively small pool of 
non-OECD hosts. It might be wiser to omit this country since it was a host in the larger country 
of Yugoslavia, but omitting its observations does not substantially change our results.  
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While these comparisons are admittedly broad, some trends are apparent. Host countries 
have slightly higher average unemployment rates and lower growth rates of real GDP and real 
exports compared to non-host countries. While these summary statistics paint a negative picture 
for developed host countries, it is probably reflective of the majority of hosts are developed 
nations. These economies tend to be stable and are less likely to experience substantial peaks or 
valleys in macroeconomic data.  
In order to understand the gap in macroeconomic indicators between hosts and non-hosts, 
the next set of comparisons in Table 6 restricts the sample in two ways. The first comparison 
between hosts and non-hosts is only among OECD countries, and the second comparison 
between hosts and non-hosts is only among non-OECD countries.  These comparisons are 
broadly similar to host/non-host comparison using the entire sample: hosts have lower mean 
growth rates of GDP and exports and higher unemployment. However, among non-OECD 
countries the gap between mean growth rates closes. This suggests that, among non-OECD 
countries, hosts are not a select group.  
Table 7 begins with a comparison of OECD and non-OECD countries. Not surprisingly, 
OECD countries have higher GDP and exports growth rates and lower unemployment. In 
addition, the standard deviation of these indicators are higher in for non-OECD countries, 
suggesting that non-OECD countries are a less homogenous group than OECD countries. This 
trend is more pronounced among hosts. Roughly the same gap in GDP growth, exports growth, 
and unemployment rates between OECD and non-OECD countries when the sample is restricted 
to only host countries. However, the gap in standard deviations for GDP growth and 
unemployment is considerably larger. Some of this disparity is caused by small-sample bias. 
There are only six non-OECD countries that have hosted an Olympics or the World Cup. One of 
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these countries, Russia, enjoyed considerable growth in GDP in the aftermath of the fall of the 
Soviet Union. Taken together, these controls offer little guidance in determining the typical host 
country.  
Perhaps a better method is to examine the path of these indcators prior, during and after 
hosting an event. Many boosters of these events tout large economic gains from hosting, a 
phenomenon that has little to no support in the academic literature. The gains from hosting are 
not necessarily restricted to the time of the event. Before the event is staged, a significant 
investment in infrastructure is typically required. This usually means new stadium/venue 
construction, and for some countries significant infrastructure improvements to ensure lodging 
and transportation for all of the participants and spectators.  During the event there is an influx of 
tourusm and attention to the host site. After the event the host country could see gains from 
receiving the world spotlight.  
Figure 1 presents the path of GDP growth rates for all host countries. It also includes the 
same paths for OECD and non-OECD hosts. Each path of GDP growth rates appears to fluctuate 
around a horizontal trend, with the expection of non-OECD hosts two or three years after the 
event. During these years, real GDP grows by an average of five percent.  
 For developing prospective host coutries, it is easy to be motivated by these numbers. On 
their surface, they paint a picture of countries with rising profiles that are, in part, thanks to 
hosting an Olympics or World Cup. Alternatively, these host countries may have benefitted from 
returns to their investment in infrastructure. This is especially true for developing countries who 
become hosts and require significant infrastructure upgrades in order to accommodate a weeks-
long influx of tourism.  
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 Unfortunately, the academic literature has not been able to link hosting an Olympics or 
World Cup with economic growth. There are several reasons this may occur. One common 
explanation is that even these large, long-lasting events are small relative to the host country’s 
annual economy. This is even true for under-developed nations that have hosted events. In 
addition, this analysis provides no causal relationship between hosting and GDP. However, we 
cannot rule the impact of hosting for the same reason. This late-blooming growth, particularly in 
non-OECD countries could be the result of infrastructure investments these countries made in 
order to host.  
A second common explanation for less-than-expected economic gain is substitution. In 
order to service the influx of touriusts into an area, some resources are diverted from other 
industries. Baade, Baumann, and Matheson (2010) show that gains in tourism industries were 
typically offset by losses in other industries during the Salt Lake City Winter Olympics in 2002. 
There is also substitution in tourism, as these large events repel tourists who would have visited 
the city for its other amenities (Matheson, Peeters, and Szymanski, 2012).  
 The unemployment rate performance shown in Figure 2 paints a similar picture. 
Unemployment rate paths again appear to fluctuate around a constant with the same expection of 
non-OECD countries two or three years after hosting. However, unemployment rates are rising 
for this group. In other words, developing host countries tend to grow a few years after the event 
but at the expense of higher unemployment. Regardless of whether these changes are the result 
of hosting, the performance of macroeconomic indicators for host countries is mixed.  
From this analysis, we conclude that there is little to distinguish a host from a non-host 
after controlling for its OECD membership. However, host cities experience higher GDP and 
unemployment growth in the years following an event. Put another way, there is little to 
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distibguish a host ex ante even after accounting for OECD status. However, hosting is correlated 
with higher GDP growth and unemployment after the event. This leaves us with two possible 
explanations. First, there may not be a causal relationship between hosting and 
GDP/unemployment. This is ceratinly the prevailing sentiment among researchers. Alternatively, 
there is something unique about countries, particularly non-OECD members, that we have not 
captured in this analysis.  
 
Conclusions and Reflections on Brazil 
Empirical research into the true economic impact of mega-events on host economies 
tends to show that major sporting events bring high costs with low rewards. The potential risks, 
but also possibly the potential rewards, from hosting mega-events may be even higher for  
developing nations. Mega-events may allow governments to overcome political constraints to 
allow beneficial infrastructure investments to be made, and the general investment needs of 
developing countries are likely to be higher than in industrialized nations. However, overcoming 
these political constraints comes at a very high cost in terms of money spent on unproductive 
investments in sport infrastructure and tournament operations, and there is also no guarantee that 
any all general infrastructure investments will provide a net positive return for the cities 
involved.  
While the recent trend has been to “reward” developing countries with the opportunity to 
host mega-events such as the World Cup and the Olympics, the empirical evidence suggests that 
if rich countries want to promote economic development in poor countries, it would make more 
sense for high-income nations to explicitly keep these events out of the developing world and 
instead continue to award the games to rich countries that are better able to absorb more of the 
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associated costs than low-income countries. Alternatively, the industrialized world could 
subsidize these events when they are held in poor countries through sponsorship or by direct 
foreign assistance although seems unlikely that rich countries would be willing to subsidize poor 
countries’ hosting efforts when the two are often in direct competition with one another for the 
rights to host in the first place.  
Brazil’s upcoming events may provide one additional avenue for potential 
economic gains. Mega-events can serve to “put the host on the map” leading to higher 
levels of future tourism, trade, and investment. As noted by Matheson (2008), 
The other major intangible benefit of mega-events claimed by sports boosters is 
that of national and international exposure. Sports fans may enjoy their visit to the 
city and return later raising future tourist revenues for the area. Corporate visitors, 
it is claimed, may relocate manufacturing facilities and company headquarters to 
the city. Television viewers might decide to take a trip to the host city at some 
time in the future based on what they see during the broadcast of the mega-event. 
Finally, hosting a major event might raise perceptions of the city so that it 
becomes a “world class” city and travel destination. All of these claims are 
potential true although little empirical research has conclusively demonstrated any 
long-run connections between hosting mega-events and future tourism demand. 
There are not even any anecdotal examples of companies moving corporate 
operations to a city based on the hosting of a sporting event. 
There are individual cases where mega-events do seem to have major influence on 
future demand, but it appears that a “perfect storm” is needed. Cities that are already on 
everyone’s map, London for example, gain little in exposure from a major event since 
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they are already at nearly maximum exposure. Other cities such as Atlanta or many 
Winter Olympics hosts also gain little from exposure because the cities have little to offer 
potential tourists after their events. Advertising without a subject to advertise is likely to 
be an exercise in futility. Under very specific conditions, however, a “hidden gem” can 
raise its international profile by hosting a major event. This appears to have been the case 
with Barcelona, a city with great artistic, cultural, and architectural treasures, but also a 
city long overshadowed by European capitals such as Madrid, Rome, London, and Paris, 
as well as 40 years of fascist rule. By 2012, twenty years after their moment on the world 
stage, Barcelona was the fourth most visited city in Europe. Barcelona’s tourism 
experience, however, has not been replicated in the majority of Olympic hosts. Brazil in 
general, and Rio in particular, offer unparalleled travel opportunities for tourists, but may 
have been underutilized as vacation destinations by world travelers.  In is possible that 
Brazil’s upcoming moments in the spotlight could bring long-run increases in global 
tourism, but it is important to note that Brazil in incurring very certain costs today for 
very uncertain future benefits.  
It remains a widespread belief among countries that there are substantial national 
gains to be made from hosting these global events, but the evidence indicates that this is 
rarely the case.  Samuel Johnson once wrote that second marriages reflect “the triumph of 
hope over experience.” Such thinking also pervades the vigorous competition among 
countries to host these exciting but economically questionable events.  
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previous work published as “Assessing the infrastructure impact of mega-events in emerging 
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Table 1:  Summer and Winter Olympic Games bids 
Event Bids from 
industrialized 
(OECD) countries 
Bids from 
developing 
countries 
Bids from Eastern 
Bloc or former 
Soviet states 
Summer Olympics: 
1896-1996 
71 (82%) 9 (10%) 7 (8%) 
Summer Olympics: 
2000-2016  
21 (49%) 19 (44%) 3 (7%) 
Winter Olympics: 
1924-1998  
51 (93%) 1 (2%) 3 (5%) 
Winter Olympics: 
2002-2014  
18 (56%) 3 (9%) 11 (34%) 
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Table 2: Examples of Mega-Event ex ante Economic Impact Studies 
 
Event Year Impact Source 
World Cup (Japan) 2002 $24.8 billion Dentsu Institute for Human Studies, Finer (2002) 
World Cup (South Korea) 2002 $8.9 billion Dentsu Institute for Human Studies, Finer (2002) 
World Cup (South Africa) 2010 $7.5 billion 198,400 jobs Grant Thornton SA, Rihlamvu (2011) 
World Cup (South Africa) 2010 $12 billion 483,000 visitors Grant Thornton SA, Voigt (2010) 
Summer Olympics (Atlanta) 1996 $5.1 billion 77,000 jobs Humphreys and Plummer (2005) 
Winter Olympics (Salt Lake City, UT) 2002 $4.8 billion 35,000 jobs 
Center for Public Policy and 
Administration, Pace (2006) 
Winter Olympics (Vancouver, BC) 2010 $10.7C billion 244,000 jobs InterVISTAS Consulting (2002) 
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Table 3:  Examples of Mega-Event ex post Economic Impact Studies 
 
Event Years Variable Impact Source 
Summer Olympics 
(Atlanta) 1996 Employment 3,500 - 42,000 jobs 
Baade and Matheson 
(2002) 
Summer Olympics 
(Atlanta) 1996 Employment Approx. 75,000 
Feddersen and Maennig 
(2012) 
Winter Olympics 2002 Employment 4,000-7,000 jobs Baumann, Engelhardt, and Matheson (2012a) 
Winter Olympics 2002 Retail Sales Positive, hotels Negative, retailers 
Baade, Baumann and 
Matheson (2010) 
World Cup 1994 Employment Not statistically significant 
Baumann, Engelhardt, 
and Matheson  (2012b) 
World Cup 2006 Employment Not statistically significant 
Allmers and Maennig 
(2009) 
World Cup 1994 Personal Income Down $4 billion Baade and Matheson (2004) 
World Cup 2006 Personal Income Not statistically significant 
Allmers and Maennig 
(2009) 
World Cup 2006 Employment Not statistically significant 
Allmers and Maennig 
(2009) 
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Table 4: Costs of Hosting Mega-Events 
 
Event Years Type Spending  (millions, $’11) 
Source 
Summer Olympics 
(Seoul) 1988  
Sports Infrastructure 
General Infrastructure 
$2,856 
$4,870 Preuss (2008) 
Summer Olympics 
(Barcelona) 1992  
Sports Infrastructure 
General Infrastructure 
$1,731 
$14,517 Preuss (2008) 
Summer Olympics 
(Atlanta) 1996  
Sports Infrastructure 
General Infrastructure 
$798 
$999 Preuss (2008) 
Summer Olympics 
(Sydney) 2000  
Sports Infrastructure 
General Infrastructure 
$1,672 
$1,725 Preuss (2008) 
Summer Olympics 
(Athens) 2004  Total Cost $13,813 Preuss (2008) 
Summer Olympics 
(Beijing) 2008  
Sports Infrastructure 
Total Spending (est.) 
$1,758 
$45,000 
Preuss (2008); Baade 
and Matheson (2012) 
Summer Olympics 
(London) 2012 Total Cost $15,000 - $20,000  Burns (2012) 
Summer Olympics 
(Rio) 2016 Total Cost $18,000 Zimbalist (2011) 
Winter Olympics 
(Nagano) 1998 Total Cost Over $14,000 Longman (1998) 
Winter Olympics 
(Turin) 2006 Total Cost $4,100 Payne (2008) 
Winter Olympics 
(Vancouver) 2010 Total Cost C$5,900 Economist (2011) 
Winter Olympics 
(Sochi, Russia) 2014 Total Cost 
$51,000 
(estimated) RT.com (2013) 
World Cup (Japan 
/South Korea) 2002 Sports Infrastructure 
$2,000 (S. Korea) 
$4-$5,600 (Japan) 
Sloan (2002) 
 
World Cup 
(Germany) 2006 Sports Infrastructure $1,870 Downie (2012) 
World Cup (South 
Africa) 2010 
Sports Infrastructure 
Total Cost 
$1,300 
$3,900 
(Voigt, 2010; Baade 
and Matheson, 2011).   
World Cup (Brazil) 2014 Sports Infrastructure General Infrastructure 
$3,680 
$13,000 (est.) Downie (2012) 
World Cup 
(Russia) 2018 
Sports Infrastructure 
Total Cost 
$7,500 (est) 
$44,000 (est.) Kuvshinova (2013) 
World Cup (Qatar) 2022 Total $200,000 (est.) AP (2013) 
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Table 5: Hosts 
OECD Members are Starred  
 
Summer Olympics Winter Olympics World Cup 
Moscow, U.S.S.R. 
1980 
Lake Placid, U.S.A.* 
1980 
Spain* 
1982 
Los Angeles, U.S.A.* 
1984 
Sarajevo, Yugoslavia 
1984 
Mexico 
1986 
Seoul, South Korea 
1988 
Calgary, Canada* 
1988 
Italy* 
1990 
Barcelona, Spain* 
1992 
Albertville, France* 
1992 
U.S.A.* 
1994 
Atlanta, U.S.A.* 
1996 
Lillehammer, Norway* 
1994 
France* 
1998 
Sydney, Australia* 
2000 
Nagano, Japan* 
1998 
South Korea* & Japan* 
2002 
Athens, Greece* 
2004 
Salt Lake City, U.S.A.* 
2002 
Germany* 
2006 
Beijing, China 
2008 
Turin, Italy* 
2006 
South Africa 
2010 
London, U.K.* 
2012 
Vancouver, Canada* 
2010 
Brazil 
2014 
Rio de Janiero, Brazil 
2016 
Sochi, Russia 
2014 
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Table 6: Mean GDP Growth, Unemployment, and Exports Growth Rates  
(Standard Deviations in Parentheses) 
 
 Mean  
GDP Growth  
Rate 
 Mean Unemployment 
Rate 
Mean 
Exports Growth Rate 
Host vs. Non-Host    
Host Countries 2.77 
(1.91) 
n = 17 
9.57 
(6.72) 
n = 17 
5.22 
(2.94) 
n = 17 
Non-Host Countries  3.98 
(1.98) 
n = 127 
9.02 
(5.25) 
n = 73 
7.41 
(5.53) 
n = 123 
Only OECD    
Host Countries 2.13 
(0.62) 
n = 11 
8.32 
(3.82) 
n = 11 
4.18 
(1.91) 
n = 11 
Non-Host Countries  2.57 
(0.88) 
n = 12 
6.45 
(2.52) 
n = 12 
5.74 
(2.37) 
n = 12 
Only non-OECD    
Host Countries 3.95 
(2.89) 
n = 6 
11.86 
(10.29) 
n = 6 
7.15 
(3.68) 
n = 6 
Non-Host Countries  4.11 
(2.01) 
n = 115 
9.61 
(5.50) 
n = 61 
7.55 
(5.76) 
n = 111 
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Table 7: Mean GDP Growth, Unemployment, and Exports Growth Rates  
(Standard Deviations in Parentheses) 
 
 Mean  
GDP Growth  
Rate 
 Mean Unemployment 
Rate 
Mean 
Exports Growth Rate 
OECD vs. Non-OECD    
OECD Countries 2.35 
(0.78) 
n = 23 
7.34 
(3.27) 
n = 23 
4.99 
(2.25) 
n = 23 
Non-OECD Countries 4.12 
(2.04) 
n = 121 
9.72 
(5.99) 
n = 67 
7.57 
(5.64) 
n = 117 
Only Host Countries    
OECD Countries 2.13 
(0.62) 
n = 11 
8.32 
(3.82) 
n = 11 
4.18 
(1.91) 
n = 11 
Non-OECD Countries 3.95 
(2.89) 
n = 6 
11.86 
(10.29) 
n = 6 
7.15 
(3.68) 
n = 6 
Only Non-Host Countries    
OECD Countries 2.57 
(0.88) 
n = 12 
6.45 
(2.52) 
n = 12 
5.74 
(2.37) 
n = 12 
Non-OECD Countries 4.11 
(2.01) 
n = 115 
9.61 
(5.50) 
n = 61 
7.55 
(5.76) 
n = 111 
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Figure 1: Mean Growth Rates of  Real Gross Domestic Product Hosts Prior, During, and After the Event 
 
 
 
Note: Each time frame constructs a mean, but the number of countries varies because of sample frame restrictions. 
For all countries, each mean is based on between 23 and 25 countries. For OECD countries, each mean is based on 
17 and 20 countries. For non-OECD countries, each mean is based on between 3 and 6 countries. 
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Figure 2: Mean Unemployment Rates of Hosts Prior, During, and After the Event 
 
 
 
Note: Each time frame constructs a mean, but the number of countries varies because of sample frame restrictions. 
For all countries, each mean is based on between 23 and 26 countries. For OECD countries, each mean is based on 
17 and 20 countries. For non-OECD countries, each mean is based on between 3 and 6 countries. 
